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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2002, Petitioner filed with the lower court his postconviction petition seeking to
conduct DNA testing on still extant forensic evidence from the investigation into the murder for
which he stands convicted and sentenced to death. R. Vol I, p.5 et seq. Petitioner later moved in
the court below to amend two counts into his petition. The lower court denied that motion and,
because Petitioner then withdrew Count One, dismissed the matter. R. Vol. I, p.222. This is an
appeal from the dismissal, addressing the lower court's denial of Petitioner's motion to amend
two counts into his successive postconviction petition.
Each of the two counts which Petitioner sought to amend into his petition concerned
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") testing of swabs used to recover evidence, which turned
out to be semen, from the victim's mouth and vagina. The prosecution had conducted its own
testing on the swabs before having them sent to the FBI. In particular, the Idaho crime lab
performed PGM testing. That lab's test results showed that Petitioner could have been the
contributor; that is, the state lab determined that Petitioner's and the swab's PGM shared certain
features. However, the FBI lab conducted more refined PGM testing. Within forty-two days of
filing his Motion To Amend Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner had learned that the
FBI test results "did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen."(See Vol. I,
p.123-7 (Ajfidavit In Support Of First Amended Petition For Post-conviction Relief at Exhibit 2
(Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., sworn statement))).
Petitioner's proposed Count Two alleged prosecutorial misconduct including the
functional equivalent of suborning perjury during the jury trial, to the effect that Petitioner was a
possible contributor of the semen. Proposed Count Three alleged that Petitioner committed
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neither any of the offenses of conviction nor any of their lesser included offenses, and for proof
he relied on the FBI' s PGM testing results and Dr. Hampikian' s affidavit as described above.
This count alleged that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate his factual innocence of the
offenses.
A.

Proposed Count Two's Three Critical Points: The Prosecution (1) Knew Or Should
Have Known That FBI Pre-trial Testing Performed At The Prosecution's Request
Excluded Petitioner As A Contributor Of The Semen Removed From The Victim;
(2) Elicited But Did Nothing To Correct Patently False Trial Testimony From Its
Forensic Expert That Petitioner Was A Potential Contributor Of The Semen
Removed From The Victim, And It Failed To Correct That Same Expert's
Misleading Testimony On Cross-Examination; And (3) Exacerbated This
Misconduct By Asserting In Closing Argument To The Jury That Petitioner
"Matched" The Semen When Its Expert Had (Falsely) Testified That Petitioner Was
Only a Possible Contributor.

Two documents were attached to Petitioner's Affidavit In Support Of First Amended
Petition For Post-conviction Relief: (I) the FBI document dated about six months pre-trial which

memorialized the results of its more refined PGM testing, as compared to the PGM testing for
the prosecution by the state laboratory, of swabs of semen removed from the victim's mouth and
vagina' (see R.Vol. I, p.120-22 (Exhibit 1)); and (2) the June 20, 2005, sworn statement, from
Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., an expert in forensic biology and a Boise State University associate
professor with a joint appointment in Biology and Criminal Justice Administration,2 in which he

'The state laboratory and the FBI both conducted what is referred to
phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing. PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found
in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's
particular PGM features. There are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As
noted in the text, the FBI testing was more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state
laboratory.
2

Since attesting to that statement, Boise State University has promoted Dr. Hampikian to
full professor and granted him tenure.
2

I

noted that while the State of Idaho Forensic Laboratory testing on swabs of semen removed
from the victim "did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a potential contributor of the semen(,! ..
.the more refined test performed by the FBI3, at the request of the Idaho lab, did absolutely
exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen."(See R. Vol I., p.123-7 (Exhibit 2)).

To remove the possibility that a court might think that the information in Dr.
Hampikian's June, 2005, affidavit was unavailable to forensic experts at and before the time of
Petitioner's trial, Petitioner filed a second affidavit from Dr. Hampikian in December, 2005. In
that supplemental affidavit, Dr. Hampikian attests that:
[T]he kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I
reached in my June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally
accepted by forensic biologists and forensic serologists in 1987, it
also was a basic tool known to and employed by forensic experts in
investigating offenses where evidence containing body fluids might
help uncover a perpetrators identity. The kind of analysis I
employed using the FBI PGM subtyping test results was, in 1987,
on a par with similar uses of blood typing test results. Indeed, the
State crime laboratory letter to the FBI Laboratory's Forensic
Serology Unit requesting PGM subtyping was a standard and
typical request when it was made on June 3, 1987. See Appendix 1
(State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Bureau of
Laboratories' senior Criminalist Ms. Pamela J. Marcum's letter to
FBI) .... Ms. Marcum's correspondence shows clearly that the
State of Idaho crime laboratory reflected the universal acceptance
by forensic biologists and forensic serologists of PGM subtyping
and the kind of analysis I conducted to reach the conclusion I
arrived at in my June 20, 2005, affidavit. The results reported by
the FBI in its July 13, 1987, letter to Ms. Marcum were clear,
unambiguous, and used a standard reporting language that would
be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic biologist of the
day. See appendix 2 (FBI Laboratory report to Ms. Marcum) ...
.This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic] from being the

3

Here, Dr. Hampikian is referring to the same FBI test results memorialized in the FBI
document attached to the affidavit as Exhibit I and dated about six months pre-trial.
3

donor of the semen sample found on the victim[.] .. furthermore,
there is no indication in the FBI report that this finding could be an
artifact, or that there was any evidence of a mixture in the sample.
The standard and universally accepted conclusion in 1987 (as
today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhoades [sic) does
not match the questioned semen sample (Ql) taken from the
victim's body. Paul Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of
the semen sample Ql.

R. Vol. I, p.199-202 (emphasis added).
The Affidavit In Support Of First Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief notes
that:
While [the prosecution] knew or should have known that the FBI
laboratory report exonerated Petitioner, it not only failed to dismiss
the charges against Petitioner, it elicited testimony from its forensic
expert...that his ... PGM test results revealed that Petitioner was a
potential contributor of the semen recovered from the victim. See,
e.g. Tr. at 1687-89. [Trial Tr.Vol. VI, p. 1687-89, esp. p. 1689, Ls.
9-13.]
R. Vol. I, p.115. The prosecution forensic expert also testified that the PGM test results from
swabs of the crotch of the victim's sweatpants revealed that Petitioner was a potential
contributor. 4 While the prosecution's forensic expert direct examination testimony was true as
far as it went, the prosecution omitted to elicit information critical to fully and fairly evaluating
the state crime laboratory's test results. Specifically, the prosecution failed to inform the jury
through this expert witness or any other witness that the more refined FBI laboratory tests yielded
results which contradicted the Idaho crime laboratory test results. In failing to do so, the
prosecution engaged in the functional equivalent of suborning perjury. The prosecution
exacerbated its misconduct by allowing its expert witness, on cross-examination, to further

4

Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.1661, Ls. 11-12; p. 1663, Ls. 13-25; & p. 1164, Ls. 1-9.
4
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mislead the jury that the scientific testing conducted on the recovered semen inculpated
Petitioner even though it knew or should have known that the testing exculpated him:

Q.

. ..Now, as I understand it, there's also other tests

available to subtype or subclass the PGM
readings?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And it's a fact that you personally did not run any
of those tests, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

Would that not have been helpful to you in further
including or excluding possible donors in this
particular case?

A.

Those samples were sent off for that subtyping.

Q.

And they were also inclusive weren't they?

A.

I can't address those results, I did not do the
analysis.

Tr.at 1779. [Tr. Vol. VI,p. 1779.]
R. Vol I, p.115 (emphasis added). Worse, in closing argument, the prosecution transformed its

forensic expert's sworn description of Petitioner as a possible contributor [in]to a "match."
Who matches that semen? Only the defendant, Paul Ezra Rhoades .
. . .He, alone of the persons who had access, matches.

And as between those two men seen in that van this defendant,
Paul Ezra Rhoades, is the only one who, matches those
characteristics.

5
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There's an interesting point that both semen samples, that in the
vagina and that in the mouth match this defendant, they match each
other. What does that tell us? That they were deposited by the
same individual. It's not coincidence that they're the same, but
they're the same because they were deposited by this defendant.
Tr. at 2120-21. (Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 2120, Ls. 7-13 & 17-25; p. 2121,
Ls. 1-3 & 11-16.)
R. Vol. I, p.115-16 (emphasis added).
Based on the FBI document, Dr. Hampikian's sworn statement, and transcript excerpts,
Petitioner moved to amend into his petition two counts (Counts Two and Three). In his proposed
Count Two, Petitioner claimed that the prosecution's (1) failure to advise trial counsel or
subsequent counsel of the FBI testing's exoneration of Petitioner, (2) failure to dismiss the
charges against Petitioner, (3) failure to correct its expert witness' false and misleading
testimony, and (4) exaggeration of that witness' testimony in guilt phase closing argument
violated Petitioner's rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Napue v. lllinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 6 (cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited) and 13 (due process guaranteed) of the Idaho Constitution, as
well as Sivak v. State, 8 P.3d 636,647 (Idaho 2000) ("Applying this rule as the State requests
would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive
post-conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed
by prosecutorial misconduct."). As it relates to Petitioner's proposed Count Two, this appeal is
brought pursuant to those same authorities.

6

B.

Proposed Count Three: Actual Innocence.
In his proposed Count Three, Petitioner claimed that he was actually innocent of the

offenses of conviction as well as any of their lesser included offenses. He claimed, alternatively,
that if he was unable to meet the actual innocence burden required for release, he would at least
meet the burden required to have all previously defaulted claimed considered on their merits.
Proposed Count Three rested on the FBI's test report and Dr. Hampikian's sworn statement
described above as well as the prosecution's contention that the rapist and killer was a single
person. It was brought pursuant to Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (l 993); Jackson v.

Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) ("As we have noted, ... a majority of the Justices
in Herrera would have supported a claim of free-standing actual innocence"); Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298 (1995); Idaho Code Sections 19-2719, 19-4901 et seq., 19-4201 et seq., the Idaho
Constitution, Article 1, Sections I (right to defend life and liberty guaranteed), 2 (equal
protection guaranteed), 3 (United States Constitution as supreme law of the land), 5 (habeas
corpus guaranteed), 6 (cruel and unusual punishment prohibited), 13 (due process guaranteed),
and the United States Constitution, Article!, Section 9 (right to habeas corpus), and the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As it relates to Petitioner's proposed Count
Three, this appeal is brought pursuant to those same authorities.

C.

The Lower Court's Rationale For Denying Petitioner's Motion To Amend:
Petitioner Could Have Obtained An Expert Opinion When He Filed The Original
Post-Conviction Petition In This Action.
In denying Petitioner leave to amend into his petition either of his two proposed counts,

the court below reasoned that because forensic scientists in 1987 would have reached the same
conclusion as Dr. Hampikian did in his affidavit,
7

Petitioner and his defense counsel could have known of a potential
Brady claim when the first post-conviction petition was filed in
2002 .... Petitioner could have obtained an expert to review the
report when he filed the Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific
Testing in 2002. Therefore, any grounds for a potential
Brady claim could have been known when the first petition for
post-conviction relief was filed in 2002.
R. Vol. I, p.215. Thus, the court concluded that with regard to each of the claims contained in
the two proposed counts, Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code Section 192719( 5)(a). Id & Id at 216 ("Because the claim of innocence is based on the same allegations
as the Brady claim, the Court finds the claim of innocence was known or could have been known
when Petitioner filed the first petition in 2002.")

.I

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Petitioner filed a motion to amend two counts (which, between them, included several
claims) stemming from the then-very recently obtained opinions of a genetic biology expert
regarding a Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratory report considered by itself and, as well, in
tandem with Idaho state laboratory test results. Specifically, Petitioner sought to amend into his
petition claims of outrageous prosecutorial misconduct as well as the claim that he is actually
innocent of the offenses of conviction (and any and all of their lesser included offenses). The
prosecutorial misconduct claims include but are not limited to claims that the prosecution elicited
but failed to correct its forensic expert's false testimony that his testing established that Petitioner
was among the potential contributors of the semen removed from the victim's vagina and mouth
even though the prosecution knew or should have known that the FBI laboratory test results,
which were more refined and, therefore, trumped the state lab test results, established Petitioner's
8
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actual innocence.
Petitioner was put on notice of those claims when his retained expert genetic biologist,
Dr. Hampikian, provided his opinion that the FBI test results excluded Petitioner as a contributor
of the semen collected from the victim. Petitioner received that opinion within forty-two days of
filing his Motion To Amend Petition For Post-Conviction Relief and supporting documents.
Petitioner had retained Dr. Hampikian out of an abundance of caution in this case where the
Petitioner's life hangs in the balance, not because he had at that time evidence of prosecutorial
misdeeds. The district court denied the motion to amend, ruling that Petitioner failed to satisfy
the timeliness requirements ofldaho Code Section l 9-2719(5)(a) because he could have obtained
an expert opinion when he filed his 2002 Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing.
Thus, there are three related issues in this appeal:
(1) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to
amend even though Petitioner had no notice of the prosecutorial misconduct claims until
he consulted an expert out of an abundance of caution, and even though neither trial
defendants nor postconviction petitioners have any obligation to search for evidence of
prosecutorial misdeeds, absent notice of their existence;
(2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to
amend even though Petitioner had no notice of the factual basis of the actual innocence
claim, and even though neither trial defendants nor postconviction petitioners have any
obligation to search for evidence of actual innocence; and
(3) Whether denying Petitioner who presented a prima facie claim of actual innocence
leave to litigate that claim even though he may not otherwise have met the timeliness
9

requirements ofldaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) violated his right to bring such claims
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 4901(a)(4) and whether it violated his rights against
cruel and unusual punishment and to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Idaho
Constitution, Article I, Sections 6 and 13; and Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 642, 8 P.3d
636, 647 (Idaho 2000) ("Applying this rule as the State requests would result in Idaho
courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive postconviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material or had been
suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct.").

ARGUMENT
THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CHARGING
PETITIONER WITH THE DUTY TO VERIFY THAT THE
PROSECUTION DID NOT OBTAIN HIS CONVICTION THROUGH
DECEIT VIA AN EXPERT WITNESS.
Despite the fact that neither trial defendants nor postconviction petitioners are duty-bound
to search for prosecutorial deceit and other misdeeds absent notice of its existence, the court
below ruled that, "Since Petitioner has possessed the FBI report since 1987, and there is no
contrary evidence, the Court finds that Petitioner could have obtained an expert to review the
report when he filed the Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing in 2002."
Idaho law is clear that a successive postconviction petition is timely if (1) it was not
reasonable to expect the petitioner to have known of its underlying facts at the time of his first
petition and (2) if the successor petition was filed within a reasonable amount of time of his

10
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discovering the underlying facts. In Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257,261, 32 P.3d 151, 155 (Idaho
2001), this Court held "that even if the State violated a petitioner's right to due process by
withholding evidence, the petitioner was required to raise this issue, like other constitutional
issues, within the time frame mandated by I..C. §19-2719. See McKinney [v. State], 133 Idaho
[695,] 706-07, 992 P.2d [144,] 155-56 [(Idaho 1999)]." When considering successive
postconviction petitions, "the Court initially examines whether the information alleged by [the
petitioner) to be exculpatory reasonably should have been known at the time of [the petitioner's]
first post-conviction petition." Id
This Court has noted several strict rules created and enforced to ensure the integrity of
trials as a truth finding process. These rules and their purpose are relevant here.
Defense attorneys are entitled to rely on the presumption that
prosecutors have fuJiy discharged their official duties, including the
duty to disclose exculpatory material. [Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 286-87 (1999)].
A State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false
testimony, to obtain a conviction[,] Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959)[, and that] [t]his standard applies not only to false evidence
solicited by the prosecution, but also to false evidence that the
prosecution allows to go uncorrected. Id. A stricter materiality
standard applies to cases involving the prosecution's knowing use
of false testimony than to cases where the prosecution has failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence. Agurs, 427 U.S. at l 03-04. This is
because these cases "involve a corruption of the truth-seeking
function of the trial process." Id at 104. In Bagley, the U.S.
Supreme Court quoted Agurs for "the well-established rule that a
conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (quoting Agurs,
427 U.S. at 103) (emphasis added). "(T]he fact that testimony is
perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it would
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 680.

11

Sivakv. State, 134 Idaho 641,647 & 649, 8 P.3d 636,642 & 644 (2000).

I.

The Court Below Abused Its Discretion In Denying Petitioner's Motion To
Amend Proposed Count Two's Claims Into The Petition On The Ground
That Petitioner Could Have Consulted With An Expert At Time He Filed
The Original Post-Conviction Petition In This Action. Denying Legal
Recourse To Petitioner For The Prosecution's Egregious Misconduct
Violated Petitioner's Rights Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959); The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments To The
United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 6 (Cruel And Unusual
Punishment Prohibited) And 13 (Due Process Guaranteed) Of The Idaho
Constitution; As Well As Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647, 8 P.3d 636, 642
(2000).

Just as defense attorneys "are entitled to rely on the presumption that prosecutors have
fully discharged their official duties, including the duty to disclose exculpatory material," Sivak
at 642, 647, they are entitled "to assume that. .. prosecutors [ will] not stoop to improper litigation
conduct to advance prospects for gaining a conviction" such as eliciting false testimony. Banks

v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 694 (2004). However, defense lawyers and their clients may not play
the ostrich by ignoring available evidence putting them on notice of a claim until they have
gathered "a complete cache of evidence." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d
870, 875 (2008) (noting that in capital cases, the Court "has measured timeliness [for successive
postconviction petitions] from the date of notice, not the date a petitioner assembles a complete
cache of evidence."). Thus, despite the misconduct in Sivak, the Court held that because (l) the
witness had admitted in a deposition to facts contradicting his trial testimony regarding what the
prosecution gave him in exchange for his testimony and (2) that deposition was available to Mr.
Sivak at the time of his first postconviction petition, he had waived his related prosecutorial

12
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misconduct claims.
In stark contrast to Sivak, here Petitioner had no deposition or other evidence putting him
on notice that the prosecution elicited false testimony from its forensic expert, that the FBI
testing exonerated Petitioner, and, therefore, that the prosecutor failed to correct either its
forensic expert's false testimony or his grossly misleading testimony. The facts relevant to the
petition's timeliness in the case at bar is strongly analogous to those in Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho
932,934, 801 P.2d 1283, 1284-5 (Idaho 1990). The district court denied relief in Mr. Stuart's

first postconviction action in May, 1987. On the appeal of that court's denial of relief in his
second postconviction action, this Court ruled that:
The accompanying affidavits make it very evident that the facts
surrounding the second petition were not known until the summer
of 1988. It was not until a Mr. Oliver, a former Police Officer for
the city of Pierce, informed the appellant's attorney that he was
aware of the recording of the appellant's conversations that these
facts came to the attention of the appellant and his attorney. Since
the facts were unknown at the time of the first petition, we hold
that the second petition is timely and proper.

Id. Similarly, here, Petitioner filed his successive postconviction petition within forty-two days
of learning that "Dr. Hampikian determined that the FBI report excluded Petitioner as a
contributor of the seamen [sic] discovered at the murder scene and tested by the FBI." R. Vol. I,
p. 214 (lower court's decision denying motion to amend). Out of an abundance of caution based
in part on their keen awareness that Petitioner stands sentenced to death and not at all on any
evidence (because there was none) putting him on notice of any of the claims in his proposed two
count amendment, Petitioner's counsel consulted with Dr. Hampikian. Dr. Hampikian' s opinion
was the sole evidence putting Petitioner on notice of each of the claims in his proposed two count
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amendment. As in Stuart, the Court should reverse and remand with instructions to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's claims.
As well, the prosecutor's misconduct relating to false testimony in this case far
outstripped that in Sivak. Among the claims considered in Sivak was one which concerned
testimony from a lay witness to whom Mr. Sivak purportedly made admissions regarding the
offense of conviction. That witness testified falsely about what he had asked for and what he had
received in exchange for his testimony from the prosecutor's office. Much of that "testimony the
prosecutor knew to be inaccurate." Id. at 645, 650. As in Sivak, the prosecution elicited false
testimony, knew it, and failed to correct it. But the relevant similarities stop there. Most

!

important, the defense in this case did not have a deposition or any other evidence contradicting
or even suggesting that the prosecution's expert forensic witness' testimony was false. As well,
there were critical differences between the testifying witnesses in the instant case and in Sivak,
including:

•

Here, the testifying witness was a forensics expert who testified about the results
of scientific testing, thereby carrying with him an assumption of credibility, and
who had no prior convictions. By contrast, the testifying witness in Sivak was a
former Ada County inmate who testified to jailhouse conversations with the
petitioner. The Sivak jury knew that the testifying witness had recent prior
convictions for burglary (1978) and passing insufficient funds checks (1979), had
recently escaped from an Idaho penitentiary (September, I 979), that while escaped
had committed another burglru:y, was captured and again placed in jail and again
escaped, and that he was charged with having committed another burglary during
14
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that second escape. Id at 639,644 at n. 3. Consequently, the withheld
information in Sivak-the fact and particulars of the testifying witness' deal with
the prosecution in exchange for his testimony-would likely have had much less
impact than the jurors in the instant case learning that the professional expert
forensics expert had testified falsely that scientific testing showed that Petitioner
was a potential contributor of the semen.

•

Here, there is no record evidence suggesting and no reason to believe that the
testifying witness requested or received from the prosecution benefits of any kind
in exchange for his testimony. However, in Sivak, the testifying witness testified
that after testifying at the preliminary hearing, '" my escape charge got dismissed
for me."' Id 639, 644. Again, then, the testifying witness' credibility in Sivak was
already suspect, as compared to the prosecution's expert forensic witness in this
case who was presented as an objective scientist without any stake in his
testimony or the case. Consequently, the withheld information would likely have
had much more impact on the jurors here than those in Sivak.

The relevant critical differences between this case and Sivak extend beyond those
between the testifying witnesses. They include:
•

In this case, the witness testified to scientific testing and results, not
conversations. But in Sivak~ the witness testified to having had a conversation in
which the petitioner had implicitly admitted to killing the victim, explained that
he had shot and stabbed her so many times "'[b]ecause she kept on
moving, "'stated that he threw the knife handle into the river, stated that he used a
15
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.22 and that he had held a grudge against the victim. Id at 644,639.
Conversations are much more easily subject to misperception and
misinterpretation than are scientific tests and their results.
•

In Sivak, the witness did not testify in a misleading or false way on crossw

examination. Here, however, the prosecution's forensic expert testified in a
grossly misleading way on cross-examination, and the prosecution did nothing to
correct it.

•

In Sivak, the prosecution did not grossly exaggerate the witnesses testimony. By
contrast, in this case, the prosecution transformed its expert's testimony that
Petitioner was included within the universe of possible contributors of the semen
(and thus possibly the guilty party) into his being the "match."

Each of these differences underscores the particular role which the false testimony played in the
respective cases. In the instant case, except for the vigorously contested "I did it" statement, the
inculpatory evidence was wholly circumstantial. Consequently, considered individually or
cumulatively, each of the prosecutorial misconduct claims contained in proposed Count Two was
more egregious here than in Sivak.

II.

This Court Should Not Put Its Imprimatur On Killing An Individual Who
Has Proffered A Prima Facie Case Of Actual Innocence. Affirming The
Lower Court's Ruling Will Have This Effect Because There Is No Other
Legal Recourse Open To Petitioner For Pressing His Actual Innocence
Claim.

Petitioner's claim in his proposed Count Three, actual innocence, was based on the same
supporting facts as his proposed Count Two and were set out in the Affidavit In Support Of First
16
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Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, together with (1) an FBI document dated about six
months pre-trial and memorializing the results of its more refined PGM testing, as compared to
the PGM testing for the prosecution by the state laboratory of swabs of semen removed from the
victim's mouth and vagina' (see R. Vol. I, p.120-22 (Exhibit I)); and (2) a June 20, 2005, sworn
statement, from Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., an expert in forensic biology and a Boise State
University associate professor with a joint appointment in Biology and Criminal Justice
Administration,6 in which he noted that while the State of Idaho Forensic Laboratory testing
on swabs of semen removed from the victim "did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a potential
contributor of the semen[,] ... the more refined test performed by the FBI7, at the request
of the Idaho lab, did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen."(See R.

Vol. I, p.123-7 (Exhibit 2))
The Court below denied the motion to amend, ruling that, "[b]ecause the claim of
innocence is based on the same allegations as the Brady claim, the Court finds the claim of
innocence was known or could have been known when Petitioner filed the first petition in 2002."
R. Vol. I, p.216 (Opinion .... ). Petitioner incorporates the arguments from Section I, supra. For

'The state laboratory and the FBI both conducted what is referred to
phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing. PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found
in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's
particular PGM features. There are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As
noted in the text, the FBI testing was more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state
laboratory.
6

Since attesting to that statement, Boise State University has promoted Dr. Hampikian to
full professor and granted him tenure.
7

Here, Dr. Hampikian is referring to the same FBI test results memorialized in the FBI
document attached to the affidavit as Exhibit l and dated about six months pre-trial.
17

fue same reasons fuat Petitioner contends that he could not have reasonably been expected to
know of the claims contained in his proposed Count One when he filed his 2002 petition or at
any earlier date, he also contends he could not have reasonably been expected to know of the
factual basis of the actual innocence claim at that time either.
Affirming the lower court's denial will close the door to Petitioner who has proffered a
primafacie case of actual innocence. Denying Petitioner the ability to litigate his prima facie
claim would violate his rights under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Jackson v.
Calderon, 21 I F.3d I 148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) ("As we have noted, ... a majority of the Justices
in Herrera would have supported a claim of free-standing actual innocence"); Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298 (1995); Idaho Code Sections 19-2719, 19-4901 et seq., 19-4201 et seq., the Idaho
Constitution, Article 1, Sections l (right to defend life and liberty guaranteed), 2 (equal
protection guaranteed), 3 (United States Constitution as supreme law of the land), 5 (habeas
corpus guaranteed), 6 (cruel and unusual punishment prohibited), 13 (due process guaranteed),
and the United States Constitution, Article!, Section 9 (right to habeas corpus), and the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As it relates to Petitioner's proposed Count
Three, this appeal is brought pursuant to those same authorities.

CONCLUSION
Because Petitioner filed his motion to amend two counts into his pending postconviction
petition within forty-two days of having notice of the claims contained in those proposed counts,
fue court below abused its discretion in denying that motion. As well, because Petitioner
presented a prima facie claim of actual innocence, denying him leave to litigate that claim
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violated his rights under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d
1148, I 165 (9th Cir. 2000) ("As we have noted, ... a majority of the Justices in Herrera would
have supported a claim of free-standing actual innocence"); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995);
Idaho Code Sections 19-2719, 19-4901 et seq., 19-4201 et seq., the Idaho Constitution, Article 1,
Sections 1 (right to defend life and liberty guaranteed), 2 (equal protection guaranteed), 3 (United
States Constitution as supreme law of the land), 5 (habeas corpus guaranteed), 6 (cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited), 13 ( due process guaranteed), and the United States Constitution,
Article!, Section 9 (right to habeas corpus), and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments; and it also violated his right to bring such claims pursuant to Idaho Code Section
490l(a)(4).
For all these reasons, this Court must remand the case to the district court with
instructions to allow the proposed amendments and to hold an evidentiary hearing on the claims
contained therein.

II
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Dated this/2S°"~y of March, 2008.
Respectfully submitted,

Llt¾(An:Ra f'--=:._

Dennis Benjamin
ID Bar#4199
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701-2772
Telephone: 208-343-1000
Facsimile: 208-345-8274

Attorney for Petitioner Paul E. Rhoades
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I hereby certify that on this~ay of March, 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the attached document upon the attorneys named below by the method indicated
below, first-class postage prepaid where applicable.

L. LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
P.O. Box 83720
Boise Idaho 83720-0010

~S.Mail
_ Hand Delivery
Facsimile
_ Federal Express

Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
Bonneville County Prosecuting Attorney
605 North Capitol
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

~U.S.Mail
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Facsimile
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